Abstract-We consider a bi-level lottery where a social planner at the high level selects a reward first and, sequentially, a set of players at the low level jointly determine a Nash equilibrium given the reward. The social planner is faced with efficiency losses where a Nash equilibrium of the lottery game may not coincide with the social optimum. We propose an optimal bi-level lottery design problem as finding least reward and perturbations such that the induced Nash equilibrium produces the socially optimal payoff. We formally characterize the price of anarchy as well as the behavior of public goods and Nash equilibrium with respect to the reward and perturbations. We relax the optimal bi-level lottery design problem via a convex approximation and identify mild sufficient conditions under which the approximation is exact. A case study on demand response in the smart grid is conducted to demonstrate the results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced information and communications technologies have been stimulating rapid emergence of multi-agent systems where a large number of spatially distributed agents interact with each other to accomplish complex missions. Substantial effort has been spent on analysis, design and control of multi-agent systems [7] , [11] , [39] , [47] , [60] . In many practical scenarios, agents are non-cooperative and seek for heterogeneous (or even conflicting) subobjectives. This leads to competitions over limited resources and degradation of system-wide performance. To address the issue, common practices include mechanism design or incentive design which modify agents' preferences via side payment or pricing so that individual interests are aligned with social welfare. Mechanism design has been studied when the designer has complete and incomplete information on agents' types [53] . There are several classes of mechanism design with incomplete information. An auction consists of multiple bidders who submit bids according to their valuations of items being auctioned, and an auctioneer who sequentially determines item allocation and pricing. The most well-known auction mechanism is VickreyClarke-Groves (VCG) auction [13] , [21] , [59] which has been shown to be efficient and incentive compatible [20] , [23] . Contract theory [8] studies how the principal constructs a contract in the presence of asymmetric information of the agent(s). There are three major models; i.e., moral hazard [52] (the agents have hidden information after the contract), adverse selection [5] (the agents have hidden information before the contract), and signaling [54] (some confidential information is provided by the agents). Mechanisms have been applied to a variety of areas, including smart grid [35] , communication networks [24] , [26] , and transportation networks [38] . Moreover, mechanism design has been extended to dynamic scenarios where agents are incentivized to follow specified algorithms and solve computation or control problems [43] , [45] , [56] .
In mechanism design with complete information, the designer does not experience a lack of knowledge of agents' types. Therefore, the designer is able to deduce the agents' responses to its policy choice. This class includes optimal taxation [40] , game design [2] , [36] , incentive control [6] , [22] , and lottery [41] . In optimal taxation, agents maximize their own utility functions by choosing labor time and consumption, and the designer chooses the optimal tax function to maximize the overall utility. In game design, it is the designer that chooses the utility functions of agents to achieve specific control objectives and the agents maximize their utility functions. Incentive control is an incentive design in a dynamic environment where agents' control choices are influenced by rewards or prices such that a social welfare can be optimized.
As one kind of mechanism design with complete information, fixed prize lotteries have been applied to several field experiments and proven to be effective to stimulate agents' or players' investments. INSINC project in Singapore [46] is an ongoing real-world implementation of a lottery scheme for commuters, who use public transportation, to travel off peak hours. The lottery scheme successfully reduces around 7.5% of peak time demand. A similar project named INSTANT [38] is conducted in India and results in more than 20% of commuter shifts. Research [3] uses the boarding passes of local public transportation as lottery tickets, showing that the lottery increases the provision of public goods and reduces free riders. In [30] , [49] , [55] , experiments are conducted to show that lottery based incentives can effectively increase survey response rates. Moreover, lottery based incentives have been used in demand response in the smart grid [32] , [51] , mobile crowd sensing for traffic congestion and air pollution [16] and Internet congestion [34] .
Substantial effort has been exerted to develop fundamental theory of lotteries. Seminal paper [41] studies that fixed prize lotteries alleviate the free-rider problem, and nudge higher levels of public good provisions as well as aggregate payoff than voluntary contributions. A larger reward results in a greater public good and aggregate payoff. The results have been extended by many researchers. In [31] , a multi-prize lottery is studied with considering risk preferences; i.e., risk neutral versus risk averse. A sequential lottery is investigated in [15] in which it can sell more tickets than one-level lottery. Paper [44] conducts public good analysis on player size, and extends the results to a rival public good case; i.e., each player gets benefits from a portion of public goods.
Contributions. In current lottery schemes, the competition among the players induces efficiency losses; i.e., a Nash equilibrium of a lottery game may not coincide with its social optimum. The social optimum is only achieved when an infinite reward is given [41] . To address the issue, we introduce perturbation parameter chosen by the social planner, and formulate an optimal bi-level lottery design problem where a Nash equilibrium of a lottery game induces a socially optimal payoff with least reward and perturbations. On top of this, we impose general convex inequality constraints to encompass physical constraints and social planner's interest. We analyze the properties of low-level Nash equilibrium, including the price of anarchy as well as the behavior of public goods and Nash equilibrium with respect to the reward and perturbations. By leveraging the above analytical results, we derive a convex approximation of the optimal bi-level lottery design problem and identify mild sufficient conditions under which the approximation is exact. Our results are verified via a case study on demand response in the smart grid.
This paper is enriched from preliminary version [27] , and includes a set of new results. In particular, this paper derives new properties of Nash equilibrium and public goods as well as more practical bounds on price of anarchy. Additionally, this paper introduces a convex approximation of the optimal lottery design problem and show that there is no approximation error. Further, a case study on demand response is provided to demonstrate the developed results.
Paper organization. In Section II, we discuss a classic bi-level lottery scheme and its limitations. To alleviate the fundamental limitation of efficiency losses, we introduce a new perturbed bi-level lottery model and formulate the optimal bilevel lottery design problem in Section III. In Section IV, we analyze properties of low-level Nash equilibrium. Based on the properties, we relax the optimal bi-level lottery design problem as a convex optimization problem in Section V. Lastly, we conduct a case study on demand response in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We introduce a classic bi-level lottery scheme in [41] and outline its procedure in Section II-A to II-C. Section II-D discusses its limitations and motivates our problem. Please refer to [41] for comprehensive discussions on the classic lottery scheme.
A. Payoff model
Consider a social planner who holds a lottery and a set of players V {1, 2, · · · , N } who participate in the lottery. Before holding the lottery, the social planner announces a public good to be financed by the net profit of the lottery. The public good provision consists of the net profit of the lottery and benefits all the players but the amount of benefits may be different. Each player chooses a benefit function corresponding to the announced public good. Then, the social planner chooses a reward R from an action set R = (0, ∞). Given reward R, each player i invests s i to the lottery from an action set S i = [0, w i ], and receives a portion of the reward R proportional to its own investment over the total investment, and also gets benefits from the public good, where w i denotes the amount of investable wealth of player i. The action profile s {s i } i∈V ∈ S can be expressed as {s i , s −i } where s −i denotes the action profile other than player i; i.e., s −i {s j } j∈V\{i} . Given reward R, payoff function u i : S → R associated with player i is described by:
wheres i∈V s i . Payoff function (1) indicates that the lottery holds only when total investments exceeds or equals to reward R; otherwise, the social planner cancels the lottery and returns the investments to the players. The first term sī s R represents the portion of reward from the lottery and the rate sī s can be seen as the probability of winning if the reward is given by a raffle, and the players are risk-neutral; i.e., they consider the expected reward sī s R as the utility. The last term −s i denotes the cost of player i. Function h i : R ≥0 → R ≥0 represents any benefit obtained from the pre-announced public good and is a function of net profits − R. It can be also interpreted as the agent's private valuation functions on excess utility, which stimulates the agent's investment. The function is called marginal benefit function because, besides the benefits from reward R, it represents any additional utility received.
In the classic lottery, there are two important assumptions. The first one is that players experience diminishing marginal utility from the provision of the public good, which is a classic assumption in social economics [57] , [17] . The other assumption is that the public good is socially desirable; i.e., financing non-zero public good increases network-wide payoffs. The formalization of the above assumptions is as follows: Assumption 2.1: The function h i is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, h i (0) = 0, i∈V ∂hi(0) ∂G > 1, and lim G→∞ ∂hi(G) ∂G = 0. In applications, h i has been seen as any side benefit which is generated by the net-profit (or social benefits). For instance, in demand response, h i denotes the level of (inverse) harzard [32] and any side payment from the net-profit [51] . In internet congestion,
B. Low-level decision making -Nash equilibrium Given R and s −i , player i chooses s i to maximize its own payoff as follows:
The collection of local optimization problems induces a noncooperative game among the players and the game is parameterized by R. Nash equilibrium [42] defines the solution of the game.
Definition 2.1: Given R, the action profile s
Note that Nash equilibrium s * (R) highlights its dependency on reward R.
C. High-level decision making -Social optimum
The lottery is a bi-level decision making (or a hierarchical optimization) problem where the social planner at the high level selects reward first and, sequentially, the players at the low level jointly determine a Nash equilibrium given the reward. The social planner aims to choose reward R to maximize the aggregate payoff of the players at the induced Nash equilibrium:
where G(R) s * (R) − R is referred to as the public good which is obtained by transforming the net profits
, on a one-for-one basis. The hierarchical nature of the problem requires the social planner to predict the low-level Nash equilibrium when making decisions at the high level.
Inequality constraint g(s * (R), R) ≤ 0 expresses physical constraints and social planner's interest (e.g., the amount of required investments) as shown in Section VI where g :
Assumption 2.2: Function g (s * , R) is convex with respect to its arguments s * and R for = 1, 2, · · · , m.
The lottery design is an incentive design where messages are being exchanged between the social planner and agents. The agents provide the marginal benefit function h i and then the social planner provides (R, c).
D. Limitations
When g(s * (R), R) ≤ 0 is absent, Assumption 2.1 ensures that there exists a unique socially optimal public good (Proposition 2.1 in [41] )
where
due to strict concaveness of h i . The socially optimal public good maximizes the aggregate payoff, and we define the aggregate payoff i∈V h i (G * ) − G * as the socially optimal payoff. However, the socially optimal public good (as well as socially optimal payoff) is achieved only when R → ∞ (Theorem 2 in [41] ). An infinite reward is apparently impractical. Moreover, existing works do not consider convex inequality constraint g(s * (R), R) ≤ 0 in the bi-level lottery, although it is essential in many engineering applications. This paper aims to design a new incentive design to address the limitations.
III. OPTIMAL BI-LEVEL LOTTERY DESIGN
This section introduces a new practical scheme to achieve the socially optimal payoff, and satisfy convex inequality constraints. In particular, a perturbed lottery model is introduced in Section III-A and lower-level decision-making is presented in Section III-B. A new problem for the social planner is introduced in Section III-C. We highlight the differences from those in Section II.
A. Perturbed payoff model
Consider the following perturbed payoff model for player i:
where c {c i } i∈V andc i∈V c i , and c i is perturbation parameter. In (4), (R, c) is chosen by the social planner from a set R × C where C C 1 × · · · × C N , and C i [0, ∞). In the perturbed lottery, the social planner is able to choose reward R and, at the same time, change the odds of winning by perturbing the individual investments. In particular, perturbation parameter c i introduces an offset to the odds of winning but the aggregate portion remains one; i.e., i∈V si−cī
The perturbation is announced along with reward R before holding a lottery. The perturbed payoff model has been studied in [10] , [18] . In the papers, payoffs are functions of perturbed investment s i − c i where s i is an effort made by player i, and c i is an external perturbation. Likewise, perturbation c is externally given by the social planner in the current paper, and it perturbs the portions of the reward to be received by players. The external perturbation can be interpreted as an intervention of the social planner to achieve social optimum, and to satisfy convex constraint g(s * (R, c), R) ≤ 0.
B. Low-level decision making -Nash equilibrium
Given R, c, and s −i , player i chooses s i to maximize its own payoff: 
C. High-level decision making -Social optimum
As problem (2), the social planner wants to maximize the aggregate of perturbed payoffs as follows:
where g : S × R → R m remains identical to that in (2) and the dependency of public good G(R, c) s * (R, c) − R on R and c is emphasized. Since the objective function of (5) is identical to that of (2), it is maximized when G(R, c) = G * as well as constraint g(s * (R, c), R) ≤ 0 is absent. There could be multiple optimal solutions for problem (5) . So the social planner aims to choose the optimal solution induced by minimal reward and perturbation. Considering this case, we formulate the following bi-level optimization problem:
where constant α ≥ 0 represents a relative weight on the perturbationc.
IV. ANALYSIS OF LOW-LEVEL NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we study the properties of Nash equilibrium of problem (5) to solve problem (6). Theorem 4.1 summarizes important properties of the perturbed lottery at Nash equilibrium. In particular, (P1) shows the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and (P2) demonstrates that any (R, c) in the feasible set F (5) of problem (5) satisfies
helps to reduce the feasible set of interest.
Theorem 4.1: Suppose Assumption 2.1 holds. Consider any pair (R, c) ∈ R × C. Then, the following properties hold at Nash equilibrium.
(P1) Given any c i ≥ 0 for ∀i ∈ V and R > 0, there is a unique Nash equilibrium s * (R, c);
Proof: In the proof, we will drop the dependency of G, s * , U i , and V a on R and c.
We first introduce the first order condition which must be satisfied at a Nash equilibrium:
for ∀i ∈ V. If player i is active; i.e., s * i > 0, then equality holds. To prove the first order condition by contradiction, assume that ∂Ui(s * ,R,c) ∂si = > 0. Then, by the Taylor series expansion, there exists a constant δ > 0 such that
This leads to a contradiction to the definition of Nash equilibrium. The remaining part can be proven in a similar way.
(P1) Since h i is strictly increasing and strictly concave, there is ξ L > 0 such that 
Since ∂hi(G) ∂G > 0 and s i = 0 for i ∈ V \ V a , we have
which never holds when |V a | = 1 because G−c < R+G−c < 0 and c i ≥ 0.
where c k =c is applied. Thus,
If the convex constraint g(s * (R, c), R) ≤ 0 is absent in problem (5), there always exists (R, c) such that G(R, c) = G * and thus (P2) holds (which will be shown later). In other words, if the optimal value of problem (5) remains i∈V h i (G * )−G * with/without the convex constraint g(s * (R, c), R) ≤ 0, then (P2) holds.
According to (P2), we only focus on the feasible set with the constraintc ≤ G(R, c) + R in problem (5). This constraint makes us to further derive the following properties while it does not restrict the choice of (R, c). Theorem 4.2 summarizes the derived properties, and these properties are essential to solve bi-level optimization problem (6) . Furthermore, the properties reduce to those of unperturbed lottery in Section II when c i = 0. (P3) indicates that public good G(R, c) is bounded bȳ c and G * , and it is increasing in (R, c) when all the players are active. (P4) shows that all the players are active if reward R is greater than a certain threshold, and there exists a lower bound of s * i (R, c), which is a strictly increasing function in R. Moreover, in some cases, s * i (R, c) is strictly increasing in (R, c). (P5) quantifies the price of anarchy [28] which is the ratio between the socially optimal payoff and the aggregate payoff induced by the corresponding Nash equilibrium. The lower and upper bounds of the price of anarchy reveal possible efficiency losses due to selfishness of players, and they can be quantified without explicitly calculating Nash equilibrium.
The following notations are used in Theorem 4.2. Function sgn(·) is a sign function. The value R L (c) is the unique solution of
Define player i who invests non-zero wealth s * i (R, c) > 0 as an active player and define V a (R, c) {i ∈ V|s * i (R, c) > 0} as the set of all the active players. Lastly,
and V a (R, c) is the number of players who satisfy
] because H is a strictly decreasing and continuous.
Theorem 4.2: Suppose Assumption 2.1 holds. Consider any pair (R, c) ∈ R × C such thatc ≤ G(R, c) + R. Then, the following properties hold at Nash equilibrium. is characterized by
. Ifc = 0, it holds that PoA > 1 for any R < ∞ and lim R→∞ PoA(R, 0) = 1.
Proof: In the proof, we will drop the dependency of G, G,Ḡ, s * , U i , V a , R L and PoA on R and c.
(P3) Assume G ≤c. The aggregate of the first order conditions (7) is
and thus we have
∂G .
This implies G * ≤ G ≤c due to strict concaveness of h i . Now assume G ≥c. The aggregate of the first order conditions (7) of active players:
Note that s * i = 0 for i ∈ V \V a . By the fact that h i is a strictly increasing function, it becomes Now we consider the case with |V a | = N . Since all the players are active the aggregate first order condition (9) holds with equality where i∈V ∂Ui(s * ) ∂si can be regarded as an implicit function of (s * , R, c). We apply the implicit function theorem (Theorem 1.3.1 in [29] ) to (9)
. (11) Thus,
We will show that G =c if and only ifc = G * . Ifc = G * , then G =c becausec ≤ G ≤ G * . We now prove that if G =c thenc = G * . Assume G =c, then aggregate first order condition (9) yields i∈V ∂U i (s * )
The unique solution isc = G * .
We proceed to prove dG dci > 0. By applying the implicit function theorem to (9), we have
(P4) By G ≤ max{G * ,c} G U and concaveness of h i , first order condition (7) yields ∂U i (s * )
Assume
This contradicts the first order condition, and thus s * i ≥ c i .
With G U ≥c, (13) becomes We now proceed to prove that the bound
− 1 is a strictly increasing function of R without bound. By taking derivative of the bound, we have
which is strictly greater than 0 since G U ≥c and R > R L . Moreover, function L i keeps increasing without bound as R increases because lim R→∞ ∂Li ∂R = ∂hi(G U ) ∂G > 0. Now we will consider the case with |V a | = N . We will show that there is at least one i such that ds * i dR > 0 holds. Since all the players are active, the first order condition (7) holds with equality
can be regarded as an implicit function of (s * , R, c). By the implicit function theorem, relation
. . .
If we choose k = argmin i∈V s * i , it holds that
implies that there is at least one j such that
where the lower bound can be found from (10) and the upper bound can be obtained from (9): inequality (13) . Givenc ≤ G * , inequality (14) implies thatḠ ≤ G ≤ G because H is a strictly decreasing function. It holds that G ≤ G * because G * = H −1 (1) and H −1 is also strictly decreasing. Since i∈V h i (G) − G is strictly increasing in G ∈ [0, G * ] and has a maximum at
Dividing max s∈S i∈V
by (15) yields the desired result. Now we proceed to prove that PoA > 1 with any R < ∞ if c = 0, but lim R→∞ PoA(R, 0) = 1. It can be shown that
Therefore, we can conclude that lim R→∞ PoA = 1 ifc ≤ G * . The properties withc > G * can be proven similarly. We omit its details.
A pair (R, c) = (G * , G * ) satisfies G(R, c) + R −c = G(R, c) ≥ 0 and, by (P3), it holds that G(R, c) = G * . Therefore, there always exists at least one pair (R, c) such that
shows that payoff (4) does not have discontinuity becauses * (R, c) >c. Remind that PoA(R, c) = 1 if and only if G(R, c) = G * . So (P5) indicates that it is impossible to achieve optimality G(R, c) = G * with a finite reward when perturbations are not allowed; i.e., there is no finite maximizer of problem (2) . Price of anarchy is identical to Price of stability [1] which represents the ratio between the socially optimal payoff and the aggregate payoff induced by the best Nash equilibrium because there exists a unique Nash equilibrium by (P1).
Some properties of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 reduce to those in [41] where perturbations are absent. In particular, (P1) reduces to Proposition 2 of [41] where an unperturbed lottery has a unique Nash equilibrium. (P5) is consistent with Theorem 2 in [41] ; i.e., given any > 0, there exists R such that PoA(R, 0) ≤ 1 + . The lower and upper bounds of price of anarchy are newly derived in this paper and they can be calculated without finding the Nash equilibrium. Additionally, (P3), and (P4) are new and reveal the properties regarding public goods and investment, respectively.
V. CONVEX APPROXIMATION OF HIGH-LEVEL SOCIAL

OPTIMUM
Problem (6) is a bi-level optimization problem. In general, this class of problems is computationally challenging. In particular, papers [4] , [25] , [58] show that bi-level linear programs are NP-hard. Given the computational hardness, certain relaxations of problem (6) are needed in order to find computationally efficient solvers. We will leverage Theorem 4.2 to show that the following problem is a convex reformulation for problem (6) . We will also show that, under certain mild conditions, the approximation gap is zero.
The problem (16) is convex. The objective function is affine, constraintc = G * is also affine. Constraint
is convex because a composition of convex function with affine functions preserves convexity where g is a convex function by Assumption 2.2 and
is an affine function. Feasible set R×C is convex because R = (0, ∞), C i = [0, G * ] are convex sets and Cartesian products preserve convexity.
The following theorem shows that problem (16) is a convex reformulation of problem (6) if there exists a pair (R, c) such that G(R, c) = G * .
Sets F (6) , and F (16) denote the feasible sets of problems (6), and (16) respectively. Likewise, we define p * (6) , and p * (16) as the optimal values of problems (6), and (16) respectively.
Theorem 5.1: Assume that there is (R, c) ∈ F (5) such that G(R, c) = G * . Under Assumptions 2.1, and 2.2, it holds that F (16) = F (6) and p * (16) = p * (6) . Proof: Notice that there is (R, c) ∈ F (5) such that G(R, c) = G * , and this implies that we can only focus on a feasible set with constraint G + R ≥c according to (P2); i.e., all the analysis in Section IV is valid. In the proof, we will drop the dependency of G, s * , and U i on R and c. The proofs are divided into two claim statements. CLAIM 1. F (16) is a subset of F (6) . Proof: Assume that F (16) is non-empty and we pick any (R, c) ∈ F (16) . We will show that such the pair (R, c) satisfies all the constraints in (6); i.e., (R, c) ∈ F (6) .
The constraintc = G * implies that G * =c = G by (P3). Therefore, it holds that G = G * which implies (R, c) ∈ arg max i∈V U i (s * (R, c), R, c) in (6).
Usings * − R = G * =c, the first order condition yields
This inequality implies that
because G * > 0 and R > 0. Since the players are active, equality holds in the first order condition (18) as well as (19) :
Therefore, constraint (17) implies
Therefore, (R, c) ∈ F (6) . The statement holds because we pick arbitrary (R, c) ∈ F (16) .
CLAIM 1 shows that F (16) ⊆ F (6) . The objective function of (16) is min (R,c) R + αG * = min (R,c) R + αc. Therefore, solution p * (16) is an overestimate of p * (6) . We now proceed to prove that F (6) ⊆ F (16) and thus p * (6) = p * (16) . CLAIM 2. F (6) is a subset of F (16) .
Proof: Assume that F (6) is non-empty and we pick any (R, c) ∈ F (6) . We will show that the pair satisfies all the constraints in (16) .
Recall that we assume that there exist (R, c) such that G = G * , and all the other constraints are satisfied. We now provē c = G * by contradiction. Assume that there exist pair (R, c) such that G = G * butc = G * . By (14),
which holds only if G * <c ≤ R + G * or |V a | = 1. Let us consider the first case. From (9), we have
which holds only ifc ≤ G * , a contradiction. Therefore, it must hold that |V a | = 1. First order condition (7) for i ∈ V a must hold with equality. However, we have ∂U i (s * )
which contradicts to the first order condition, where
First order condition withc = G * ∂U i (s * )
implies s * i > 0, which holds for ∀i ∈ V; i.e., |V a | = N . Using the first order condition (19), we can derive
where equality holds because all the players are active. By plugging (22) into constraint (21), we obtain (17) . Therefore, (R, c) ∈ F (16) . The statement holds because we pick arbitrary (R, c) ∈ F (6) . CLAIM 1 and CLAIM 2 imply that F (6) = F (16) . The objective functions are equivalent to each other becausec = G * for the both feasible sets. Thus it holds that p * (6) = p * (16) . In Theorem 5.1, non-convex optimization problem (6) is approximated by (or equivalent to) a convex optimization problem (16) , which can be efficiently solved [9] . In particular, with c = G * , we could obtain a constant public good G(R, c) = G * by (P3) in Theorem 4.2, which sequentially results in the replacement of potentially non-concave function s individual rationality can be readily ensured by adding the convex constraints g as follows:
, one can show that the above condition is equivalent to U i (s * , R, c) ≥ 0 for ∀i ∈ V.
VI. CASE STUDY
In this section, we will apply our perturbed lottery to demand response in the smart grid. Demand response involves a load serving entity (LSE) and a set of end-users. The LSE is the social planner and wants to incentivize the end-users to shift their peak-time demand to off-peak time. The end-users participate the lottery by shifting a portion of their shiftable demands.
Consider a power transmission network described by (G, E) where G and E denote the set of buses and the set of transmission lines, respectively. In particular, V ⊆ G, and P ⊆ G denote the set of load buses with non-zero demand (end-users), and the set of generator buses, respectively. Each line l ∈ E has power flow capacity f
T . With the perturbed lottery, each end-user has payoff function (4) where decision variable s i denotes shifted demand in monetary value. Function h i represents any impetus from the public good; e.g., inverse of stability concern, utility discount, additional rewards made by the LSE. The LSE solves problem (6), in which convex constraints g represent three physical constraints; i.e., the end-users cannot shift more than the demand, and the total adjusted demand after shifting cannot exceed the total power generation, and the line capacities are enforced:
where L ∈ R |V| ≥0 and P ∈ R |P| ≥0 denote power demand and power generation, respectively. Matrix H ∈ [−1 , 1] |E|×|G| is the injection shift factor matrix where (a, b) entry of H represents the active power change on line a with respect to change in power injection at bus b. Matrices H l ∈ [−1, 1]
|E|×|V| and
|E|×|P| are the collections of columns i ∈ V and i ∈ P of H, respectively. Since L, P , f max are constants at the given time, constraints (23) are convex and thus satisfy Assumption 2.2.
We conduct case studies using IEEE 30-bus test system shown in Figure 1 where |P| = 6, |V| = 20, and |E| = 41. The system parameters are obtained from MATPOWER [61] . Money/power exchange rate $0.1/kW h is applied and 1 hour time frame is considered; e.g., the generator at bus 1 generates 23.54M W × 1h × $0.1/kW h = $2354. We intentionally increase the power demand of each load bus by 30% without changing power generations, so that demand shifts are inevitable.
We choose h i (s − R) = (100 + i) log(s − R + 1) for bus i ∈ V; e.g., bus 30 ∈ V has h 30 (s − R) = 130 log(s − R + 1). One can see that function h i satisfies Assumption 2.1. The logarithmic model of provision of public good h i is based on Cobb-Douglas utility function [14] . Recent papers [37] , [48] , [50] use such function to express the benefits from a public good. We choose α = 1.
The socially optimal public good G * = $2317 of unperturbed lottery is calculated by (3) . The socially optimal payoff is obtained by i∈V h i (G * ) − G * = $7142. We solve problem (6) by CVX [19] , and generate optimal value $5675 with solution (R * , c * ) presented in Figure 2 . The figure also presents the induced Nash equilibrium of the optimal lottery game. The aggregate payoff induces the socially optimal public goods * (R * , c * ) − R * = $5675 − $3358 = $2317 = G * , and the socially optimal payoff i∈V h i (G * ) − G * = $15644. Convex program (16) generates a large reward R * = $3358 to satisfy the physical constraints (23) . Note thatc = G * is a sufficient and necessary condition for the optimality, according to Theorem 5.1. By Theorem 5.1, the solution is identical to that of problem (6) and satisfies all the physical constraints described in (23) . Figure 3 visualizes that the first constraint is satisfied where the shifted demand never exceeds the power demand. The second constraint is also satisfied because j∈P P j = i∈V (L i − s * i ) = $18921. Figure 4 shows that power flow at each transmission line never exceeds its capacity. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study an optimal bi-level lottery design problem where a social planner aims to achieve the social optimum through least reward and perturbations. We approximate the problem via a convex relaxation and identify mild sufficient conditions under which the approximation is exact. The results are verified via a case study on demand response in the smart grid.
